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Abstract 
 In response to questions raised during the Ferguson, MO protests of 2014, this paper 
explores the relationship between economic, political, criminal, and socio-demographic factors 
and the amount of surplus military equipment that U.S. counties received through the Pentagon’s 
Excess Property Program (1033 Program) from 2006 - 2014. The results indicate that the 1033 
Program has expanded and changed significantly over this period. Population had the most 
consistent and significant positive effect on the likelihood of receiving equipment and the 
amount of equipment received. The data also supports results found in previous literature that 
areas with relatively large minority populations received less gear than other areas. Areas with 
smaller police budgets per arrest received less equipment than other areas. In the latter half of the 
period, the estimated coefficient on the percent of Republican voters became positive and 
significant, indicating that areas with proportionally more Republican voters were more likely to 
receive gear and to receive a larger amount of gear than other counties. Lastly, the results do not 
find a significant relationship between receiving a large amount of surplus gear and a change in 
crime rates over this period.   
Rue 
3 
 
Acknowledgements 
 I am deeply thankful for the tremendous support of Dr. Helen Tauchen and Dr. Klara 
Peter for this project. Dr. Tauchen provided invaluable counsel and perspective throughout this 
entire project. She guided me through developing the research question, constructing a 
theoretical model that is novel in the literature, and building empirical models to test various 
hypotheses. Dr. Peter challenged and motivated our class to go beyond our comfort zones 
exploring questions with new methods and approaches learned in the seminar. 
  
Rue 
4 
 
1. Introduction 
The Ferguson, Missouri protests of the August 2014 shooting of unarmed teen Michael 
Brown revealed the breadth and scale of the modern, militarized local police force in America. 
Images of heavily armed, militarized riot police overseeing what began as peaceful protests in 
Ferguson raised questions about how and why local police forces have such advanced military 
weapons and gear. While some police departments purchase this type of tactical equipment new 
from manufacturers, many other agencies receive surplus U.S. Military gear for little-to-no cost 
through the Pentagon’s 1033 Program.  
Since its inception in 1997, the United States Department of Defense’s 1033 Excess 
Property Program has given local law enforcement agencies over $5.1 billion in surplus military 
weapons, body armor, surveillance gear, clothes, watercraft, aircraft, armored vehicles, and more 
(Defense Logistics Agency 2014). Following the highly militarized police presence at the 
Ferguson protests, the 1033 Program has received criticism for over-arming local police forces 
and causing fear and strife between police officers and the citizens they are supposed to protect 
and serve (Landler 2014).     
 In this paper, I examine the political, criminal, economic, and demographic factors that 
determine the incidence and the amount of surplus equipment a county’s police departments 
receives from the 1033 Program. There are a number of reasons why this research is important. 
First, it informs us as to whether or not the 1033 Program equipment, which is paid for with 
billions of federal taxpayer dollars, is being distributed based on political, criminal, economic, 
demographic, or geographic factors. A related question is whether or not the program benefits 
some locations or population groups more than others.  
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 Second, this research is important in investigating the overall effectiveness of the 1033 
Program. This program exists to put surplus military gear to productive use reducing crime—
through deterrence or actual use—and supporting under-funded police departments, so it is 
important that we examine whether the program is indeed fulfilling these missions. There are 
significant financial and social costs associated with police militarization, including: program 
administrative costs, opportunity costs of donating gear instead of selling it, equipment 
maintenance/training costs at the local level, possible increased cultural strife between police and 
citizens, the possible discrimination of certain agents, and possible deaths from misused military 
equipment. It is thus crucial to confirm that the program’s benefits in reducing crime and 
protecting law enforcement agents outweigh its significant costs for citizens.  
 Lastly, because there is limited formal oversight of the 1033 Program in Washington, it is 
important that academics, journalists, and citizens research the program’s processes and 
effectiveness.  This type of research could have meaningful implications for the debate 
surrounding the Department of Defense’s Excess Property Program and possible revisions to the 
Program.   
1.1 Overview of Methods 
First, I use a probit model to estimate the likelihood that a county received any equipment 
from the 1033 Program between 2006 and 2014. A probit model is used for this analysis because 
it is able to estimate the binary dependent variable measuring whether a county received gear or 
not. Second, I use a Tobit model to estimate the amount, in logged dollars per capita, of 1033 
Program equipment a county received from the program. A Tobit model is well suited for this 
analysis because it censors the cluster of counties that received $0 of equipment, the lower limit 
in this case, from those that received greater than $0 of equipment. In both models, my baseline 
Rue 
6 
 
specification includes the following independent variables: county-level crime rates, local police 
expenditures per arrest, percent of voters that voted for the Republican candidate in national 
presidential elections, percent of residents that are African American, percent of residents that 
are other minority races, median household income, and percent of households that are owner-
occupied. My models for the likelihood and amount of military equipment distributed are novel 
in the literature. Additionally, though not the primary contributions, this paper includes a 
preliminary analysis of the relationship between receiving 1033 Program equipment and crime 
rates over time, a question that should certainly be explored in future research.   
This paper is not primarily intended to explore the use of 1033 Program equipment, but 
rather to explore how the Pentagon’s Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO) allocates excess 
gear to local law enforcement agencies across the country. By determining the extent to which 
county-level political preferences, economic factors, crime rates, and other variables affect the 
amount of surplus equipment a county’s police forces received, this paper makes a meaningful 
contribution as to whether or not the LESO is allocating equipment systematically and in line 
with the Program’s original charter.  
1.2 Contributions to the Literature 
As was mentioned above, there has been very limited economic research on police 
militarization. Because the effects of the program only emerged publicly recently and the relevant 
datasets were released just last year, few economists have written on the topic. One related paper 
by Ajilore (2015) investigates whether race affects the number of mine-resistant ambush-protected 
vehicles (MRAPs) a region receives. This paper will be discussed more fully in the “Existing 
Literature” section, but it is limited in some ways: it fails to consider the full scope of the program 
outside of surplus MRAPs; it only considers one time period, despite major differences in the 
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program following the conclusions of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; it does not consider 
state-level effects; and it does not directly consider police-expenditure variables in its regressions.  
 This paper makes a number of important contributions to the literature. First, I constructed 
a large dataset that can be used in future research on this topic. Second, I consider the full scope 
of the 1033 Program by examining dollars of all equipment received, not just the number of 
MRAPs. Third, I break the data into two periods, which allows us to add observations for the 
independent variables and consider possible changes in the program over time. Lastly, I include 
additional independent variables such as police expenditures per arrest and others.  
1.3 Summary of Results  
The analysis indicates that population had the most consistent and significant positive 
effect on the likelihood of receiving equipment and the amount of equipment received. The data 
also tend to support results found in previous literature that areas with relatively large minority 
populations received less gear than areas with smaller minority populations. Areas with smaller 
police budgets per arrest tended to receive less equipment than areas with larger police budgets. In 
the latter half of the period, the estimated coefficient on percent of Republican voters became 
positive and significant, indicating that areas with proportionally more Republican voters were 
more likely to receive gear and to receive a larger amount of gear than other counties. Lastly, we 
do not find a significant relationship between crime rates and the amount of equipment received 
by a county, but this could partially be a result of inconsistent first-stage instruments, which will 
be explained in detail later in the paper.  
What follows is a brief overview of the 1033 Program and its origins, a review of existing 
literature on police militarization, then discussions of: a novel theoretical model for equipment 
requests and allocations, the probit and Tobit empirical models, data sources, results, and 
interpretations of those results. Full citations, analytical results, and descriptions of the data 
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sources can be found in the Works Cited, Tables, and Appendices sections, respectively, at the end 
of the paper.  
2. Origins of the Excess Property Program 
The Excess Property Program was born out of Section 1033 of the 1997 National Defense 
Authorization Act (104th Congress 1996). This section of the Bill, under the header “Counter-
Drug Activities,” gives the Secretary of Defense the authorization to sell or donate surplus 
military gear, “including small arms and ammunition,” to local law enforcement agencies (104th 
Congress 1996, 2637). The four conditions of the Program are that: the Department of Defense 
must already own the equipment; the recipient must accept the gear on an as-is basis; the transfer 
must cost nothing for the Department of Defense; and the recipient must incur all costs 
associated with the equipment following the transfer  (104th Congress 1996, 2639-2640).  Part D 
of the section, the only part that discusses how the equipment should be allocated to police 
departments, states the following:  
“PREFERENCE FOR CERTAIN TRANSFERS.—In considering applications for the 
transfer of personal property under this section, the Secretary shall give a preference to 
those applications indicating that the transferred property will be used in the counter-drug 
or counter-terrorism activities of the recipient agency.” (104th Congress 1996, 2640) 
 
And lastly, the only mention of oversight is a sentence that states: “The Secretary shall carry out 
this section in consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of National Drug Control 
Policy” (104th Congress 1996, 2639). 
Given this notable lack of oversight of the Program and its clearly-defined allocation 
preference section, my research aims to use an empirical analysis to determine if indeed the 
surplus equipment is being allocated to high crime areas or if it is being allocated based on other 
political, economic, geographic, or socio-demographic factors.   
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3. Review of Existing Literature 
There is a dearth of peer-reviewed economics literature on police militarization. The 
relevant literature falls into three categories: investigative media coverage of militarization, 
political economics of police militarization, and crime economics literature on local police 
expenditures, police hiring, and the police-crime relationship.  
The most relevant economics paper on this subject is “The Militarization of Local Law 
Enforcement: Is race a factor” by Olugbenga Ajilore (2015) at the University of Toledo. In this 
paper, Ajilore used a probit model to estimate the likelihood that a county received a mine-
resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicle through the 1033 Program between 2006 and 2013. 
His independent variables included crime rate, percent African American, percent Native, 
percent Asian, percent Hispanic, a dissimilarity (segregation) index, percent who voted for 
Obama, median household income, percent owner-occupied housing, and number of law 
enforcement agencies per county. Ajilore theoretically tests the Minority Threat Hypothesis, 
which holds that the majority will seek to control a threatening minority by increasing resources 
allocated to police activities (Jackson 1989). Empirically, to handle a potential crime rate 
endogeneity concern, Ajilore used an instrumental variable technique with two instruments: 
percent of households that are female headed with no husband and percent of county population 
that are males age 20-24. I use these same instruments in my analysis to address a potential 
endogeneity concern for crime rate and police expenditures per arrest.  
Ajilore’s two most notable results are: First, conditional on crime rate, the amount of 
segregation in a county and MRAP acquisition were positively and significantly correlated; 
second, conditional on crime rate, the percent of black residents in a county and MRAP 
acquisition were negatively and significantly correlated. While the first result aligns with the 
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Minority Threat Hypothesis, the second result contradicts the hypothesis. Ajilore suggests that 
this reduction in MRAP acquisitions in counties with a higher percent of African American 
residents could be a result of police departments attempting to not appear overly-militarized with 
MRAPs, choosing instead to acquire smaller surplus weapons and gear. Another possible 
explanation is that it is the minority group’s distribution within an area, not the group’s size, 
which affects MRAP acquisition. 
In “The Electoral Budget Cycle on Municipal Police Expenditure,” Guillamón, Bastida, 
and Benito (2011) found that Spanish municipal police expenditures tended to increase the year 
before elections, likely a move by incumbent elected officials to appear ‘tough on crime,’ which 
many Spanish voters favor. Empirically, the authors argue that per capita police expenditures are 
a function of past year spending on police, political factors (e.g. election cycle variables, 
incumbent ideology, and political strength or coalition), socioeconomic factors (e.g. local 
population size, population density, government transfer payments, taxes per capita, 
unemployment rate, immigration rate, and economic level), unobserved heterogeneity, and 
random error.  The article also summarized the more theoretical work of Zhao, Ren, and Lovrich 
(2010), who found that police expenditures are a function of past budget incrementalism, local 
political culture, and socioeconomic factors. While I do not use either paper’s model directly, the 
analogous factors discussed and evaluated aided in the development of my empirical model for 
surplus gear allocation.  
In “The Militarization of U.S. Domestic Policing” (Hall and Coyne 2013) and “Keep off 
the Grass: The Economics of Prohibition and US Drug Policy,” (Boettke, Coyne, and Hall 2013), 
the overlapping authors explored the political economics that play into the militarization of U.S. 
police forces. The authors discussed the historical distinction between domestic police, which 
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fight crime but ultimately seek to protect domestic rights and peace, and militaries, which seek to 
combat and destroy an external enemy. The authors also asserted that crises in which the public 
cries out for government action, such as the War on Drugs and the War on Terror, have led to the 
blurring of this line between police and military forces. Additionally, they discussed the 
tendency of government agencies to measure success in terms of budget allocation and number 
of employees. As such, these agencies often ‘mission creep’ to expand their scope and role in 
various government activities. All of these forces, the authors believed, have led to the increasing 
role of military agencies in local police affairs. Although these papers are focused exclusively on 
political economics, they provided a valuable primer for this paper’s theoretical model.   
In Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System: The Changing Roles of the Armed 
Forces and the Police (2001) and “Militarization and policing—Its relevance to 21st century 
police”  (2007), Kraska explored various historical, political, and judicial rights issues related to 
police militarization. His work introduced the 1033 Program and quantified the scale of police 
militarization and its consequences, but did not formally examine the issue from an economic 
lens.   
In “Testing Coercive Explanations for Order: The Determinants of Law Enforcement 
Strength over Time,” Kraska (2001) discussed how Jacobs and Helms (1997) use a time series 
analysis to understand what factors determined the strength of local law enforcement agencies 
across the U.S. from 1955 to 1991. The dependent variable was per capita number of law 
enforcement officers and the independent variables were measures of economic inequality, crime 
rate, minority population, unemployment, strength of the Republican Party, and changes in the 
tax base. Most relevant to my research is the author’s finding that increases in the strength of the 
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Republican Party tended to result in increases in the number of police officers. The authors 
explain the intuition behind this trend:  
As one might expect from Republican campaign appeals and the propensity of 
Republican administrations to introduce programs that strengthen criminal justice 
agencies, expansions in the political resources of this more conservative party at both the 
national level and among the voters lead to stronger state agencies that specialize in 
coercive social control. (Jacob and Helms 1997, 1381) 
 
This finding is important because it suggests that political ideology is, indeed a good proxy for 
citizen preferences surrounding law, order, and police expenditures. As such, I use the strength 
of the Republican Party as one of the independent variables in my analysis.  
Lastly, in “Police levels and crime rates revisited: A county-level analysis from Florida 
(1980–1998),” Kovandzic and Sloan (2002, 65-76) used multiple time series analysis to explore 
the relationship between number of police employees and crime rates in Florida counties 
between 1980 and 1998. The paper began with a comprehensive literature review of the police-
crime relationship, which is a highly contested topic among crime economists. Marvell and 
Moody (1996, 609-646) found that, of 36 published papers on the police-crime relationship, only 
ten found an inverse relationship between police levels and crime rates. Kovandzic and Sloan 
point to papers by Marvell and Moody (1996) and Levitt (1997, 270-291), which highlight a 
number of theoretical and methodological problems found in traditional police-crime research. 
The theory problems involve issues with criminal decision-making theory and deterrence theory, 
which asserts that more police officers will raise a potential criminal’s chance of being caught 
and thus deter people from committing crimes. The methodological issues center on specification 
problems such as simultaneous causality bias and omitted variable bias. In order to eliminate 
such issues, the authors used a multiple time series approach with a fixed-effects model, as 
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advocated by Marvell and Moody (1996) and Levitt (1997). The authors used UCR crime rates 
for the dependent variable and number of police employees as a proxy for police levels for the 
independent variable, while controlling for: percent males ages 15–24, percent males ages 25–
34, per-capita personal income, percent unemployed, and county-level prison population figures. 
The authors used county-level data, as I do in this paper, because it helps mitigate 
overestimations of the police-crime relationship that could occur if city-level data is used and 
criminals simply shift their crime to less-policed rural areas.   
While Kovandzic and Sloan reached many interesting conclusions, the most notable is 
that a 10% increase in police levels resulted in a statistically significant 1.4% reduction in total 
crime. Robbery and burglary were the only types of crime with statistically significant negative 
coefficients, while rape and assault interestingly had insignificant positive coefficients. While 
Marvell and Moody (1996) and Levitt (1997) found strong negative correlations between police 
levels and homicide rates, Kovandzic and Sloan found a weak, insignificant relationship. This 
paper provides context for the debate on the police-crime relationship, and uses many valuable 
methodological techniques that I use in my paper.  
4. Preliminary Theoretical Model 
 The theoretical model is broken into two components: requests for equipment by local 
police departments and allocations of this equipment to local departments by the Law 
Enforcement Support Office (LESO). These features are based on portions of existing local 
government expenditures literature mentioned above.  
4.1 Requests for Surplus Equipment - Theoretical Features 
 We begin by modelling the theory behind a local police department’s requests for surplus 
gear from the Law Enforcement Support Office’s via a LESO state coordinator. At the local 
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level, elected and appointed government officials, such as the police commissioner or his/her 
representative, submit requests for available 1033 program equipment.  
Subject to constraints discussed below, elected and appointed local officials make 
decisions that maximize their welfare, which depends on their chance of re-election/re-
appointment and the benefit for the region. An official will seek to improve her chance of re-
election by acting in line with her constituents’ views on law and order. Based on the 
constituents’ preferences surrounding crime, police presence/strength, and local government 
expenditures, the politician will act to suit these preferences with the amount of gear she requests 
from the 1033 Program. The other local agents are the civil servants (law enforcement officers), 
whose wellbeing depends on the continued existence of their law enforcement jobs, their safety 
on the job, and again, the benefit for the district. While these agents do not directly request 
equipment, their needs and views guide the request decisions made by police department 
administrators.  
 The primary constraint for these administrators is a standard local government budget 
constraint: 
o Budget = ∑ Local Gov. Revenue – ∑ Spending on Local Gov. Services 
As one can see, this budget function is structurally similar to the traditional budget 
surplus/deficit function used by political economists. At the local level, most revenue is 
generated from sales taxes and property taxes. On the expenditures side, in addition to police 
expenditures, local governments spend money on schools, sanitation systems, local 
infrastructure, jails, and other services. We define Ri as the dollar amount of 1033 Program gear 
requested by law enforcement agency i. Ri is zero if the agency requests no equipment and is 
Rue 
15 
 
greater than zero if the agency requests any gear (e.g. vehicles, weapons, aircraft, clothes, office 
furniture, etc.). When choosing Ri, officials must also consider the post-acquisition costs 
associated with the items they’re requesting. Such post-acquisitions costs may include 
transportation costs, training costs, maintenance costs, storage costs, and insurance costs.  
4.2 Requests for Surplus Equipment – Theoretical Function 
o 𝑅𝑖 = 𝑓(PP𝑖, PE𝑖, CR𝑖, X𝑖)  (1) 
 Ri = The amount of gear requested by law enforcement agencies in region i 
 PPi = constituent political preferences for strong police force in region i 
 PEi = Police expenditures per arrest in region i 
 CRi = crime rates in region i 
 Xi = Average prediction of socio-geographic characteristics in region i (e.g. 
citizen income, gender, age, race, and urban/rural) 
This function, which is syntactically similar to the standard individual demand function, 
indicates that a given local official’s request for 1033 Program Equipment is a function of that 
official’s constituents’ characteristics and preferences on issues of law and order, the level of 
criminal activity in the region, and the budget with which the official is able to meet those 
voters’ preferences. Police expenditures per arrest is included as a proxy for the agency’s 
financial condition. What follows are several theoretical hypotheses that are consistent with 
common hypotheses in the literature on police budgets and policies—and which I test in this 
paper.  
Hypothesis 1: Agencies with lower police expenditures per arrest (PEi) will request more 
equipment (Ri). In these districts with tighter police budgets, officials will demand more free 
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surplus military equipment than agencies with large police budgets (where the official might 
prefer to pay for newer equipment that suits the department’s needs better than surplus gear 
would). 
Hypothesis 2: Departments in areas where citizens prefer a stronger police force (higher 
PPi) will request more equipment (Ri). In these counties, an elected official will likely request 
more surplus equipment than an official whose constituents prefer a weaker police force. As 
mentioned above, Jacobs and Helms (1997) found that Republican voters tend to prefer spending 
more per capita on police hiring than on other local government services. The hypothesis is that 
districts with a higher percentage of Republican voters will have stricter views of law and order 
and thus request more surplus military equipment to fight crime.  
Hypothesis 3: As was mentioned in the Literature Review, the Minority Threat 
Hypothesis asserts that a majority group will seek to control a threatening minority group by 
increasing resources allocated to police activities (Jackson 1989). As such, the hypothesis is that 
agencies in regions with large minority populations (e.g. racial or socio-economic minorities) 
will request more equipment in an effort to maintain majority control.   
4.3 Allocation of Equipment – Theoretical Features 
 On the allocation side of the model, our primary focus is on the federal administrators in 
the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO) and the LESO state representatives who review 
departments’ requests for equipment and make decisions on how much gear a given department 
receives. The choice variable for these individuals is ER1, …, ERN, the amount of equipment 
allocated to each of N requesting agencies. These federal officials will theoretically attempt to 
maximize welfare by allocating the surplus gear to agencies where: 1) it is requested; 2) it can be 
used most effectively, particularly in counter-drug and counter-terrorism operations; and 3) it is 
Rue 
17 
 
most needed (e.g. in police departments with relatively low budgets). A few important 
constraints follow:  
𝐸𝑅𝑖 ≤ 𝑅𝑖 for all i  (2) 
∑  𝐸𝑅𝑖 ≤ 𝐸𝑅̅̅ ̅̅
𝑁
𝑖=1  (3) 
𝑅𝑖 = 𝑓(PP𝑖, PE𝑖, CR𝑖, X𝑖) (4) 
  
Eq. 2 indicates that LESO will not allocate more equipment to an agency than the agency 
requests. Eq. 3 indicates that the total amount of equipment allocated across all agencies cannot 
exceed the amount of gear the Department of Defense retires and makes available to the 1033 
Program. Equation 4 indicates that gear is expected to be allocated to the counties that demand it 
the most, based on the request function described above.  
4.4 Allocation of Surplus Gear – Theoretical Function 
𝑬𝑹𝒊 = 𝒈 {𝑹𝒊 = 𝒇(𝐏𝐏𝒊, 𝐏𝐄𝒊, 𝐂𝐑𝒊, 𝐗𝒊),
𝑪𝑹𝒊
𝑪𝑹̅̅ ̅̅
,
𝑷𝑬𝒊
𝑷𝑬̅̅ ̅̅
,
𝑿𝒊
?̅?
}  (5) 
This final allocation equation 5, subject to the constraints above, indicates that federal 
officials choose how much surplus military gear each agency receives based on how much gear 
the agency requests (𝑹𝒊), the region’s crime rate relative to other regions, police expenditures 
per arrest relative to other regions, and socio-geographic features relative to other regions. In 
other words, a LESO representative will evaluate each request for gear relative to other incoming 
requests, and allocate the gear in a way that maximizes the benefit the gear provides.  
Hypothesis 4: Dollars of equipment received will be higher for agencies that: request 
more equipment, have higher relative crime rates, have lower relative police expenditures per 
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arrest, and have relatively large minority populations. For such counties, LESO will expect that 
gear donations will be most effective in lowering crime and assisting police departments with 
fewer financial resources.   
With this basic theoretical model for requests and allocations in mind, the empirical 
models measure the relationship between the amount of surplus equipment a county receives and 
the independent variables mentioned above. By looking at these variables and controlling for 
other items, we will be able to empirically model the Excess Property Program.  
5. Empirical Model 
 What follows are the empirical models that are used to evaluate the relationship between 
receiving equipment through the program and observable explanatory factors. I begin with an 
explanation of the probit empirical model, which is used to estimate the likelihood that a county 
received gear. I then discuss the Tobit model, which is used to estimate the dollars of equipment 
a county received. I end the section by discussing a number of important features that apply to 
both my probit and Tobit models.   
5.1 Probit Model  
In order to estimate the unobserved likelihood that a county received gear from the 1033 
Program, we begin by defining an observable binary variable, er_dummy, which reflects whether 
or not a county received any 1033 Program gear in the period. Er_dummy equals 0 if the county 
did not receive any amount of gear ($0); it equals 1 if the county received greater than $0 worth 
of gear in the period. To estimate the unobserved likelihood that a county received gear (i.e. 
er_dummy=1), we need a nonlinear model with a domain between 0 and 1. The probit model, 
which is explained below, is often used in such situations to model binary outcomes in which the 
dependent variable can only take on one of two values.  
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The probit model assumes that there is a latent continuous variable, er_dummy* and 
vector of coefficients and independent variables 𝛽𝑥 where: 
er_dummy = 1 if er_dummy* = 𝛽𝑥𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 > 0 
er_dummy = 0 otherwise 
The model specifies that Pr(𝑒𝑟_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 = 1|𝑥) = 𝐹(𝛽𝑥) is the cumulative distribution for 𝜀𝑖, 
conditional on x, which yields: 
 Pr(er_dummy*  > 0|𝑥) = Pr(𝜖 > −𝛽𝑥|𝑥) 
      = Pr(𝜖 < 𝛽𝑥|𝑥), assuming that 𝜖 has a symmetric distribution 
                                                  = F(𝛽𝑥)  (6) 
Lastly, the probit model assumes that F(𝛽𝑥) has a standard cumulative normal distribution. This 
differs from the related logit model, which assumes that F(𝛽𝑥) has a logistic distribution. As one 
can now see, the probit model with a maximum-likelihood estimator allows us to estimate the 
underlying latent propensity that er_dummy equals 1 for a county.  
 The specific independent variables which are used to estimate er_dummy* in my baseline 
specification, written in Eq. 7, are now explained. CRit-1 represents the per capita number of 
arrests in county i during time period t-1 per 100 county residents. By using a lagged crime rate, 
we can test if areas with historically high crime rates received the 1033 equipment in subsequent 
periods. PEit, represents dollars of police spending per arrest for county i during time period t. In 
this model, we use the log of PEit to account for the positively skewed distribution of its 
residuals. This variable is calculated by dividing the county’s annual police expenditures by the 
total number of arrests for county i during time period t. This variable is useful because it 
Rue 
20 
 
indicates whether a law enforcement agency’s budget is ‘stretched,’ which is a crucial 
determinant of demand for the surplus gear. Popit represents the population in county i during 
time period t, which is a necessary control for county size. As was done for police expenditures 
per arrest, I take the log of Popit to account for its residuals’ positively skewed distribution. 
Repubit represents the percent of county residents that voted for the Republican candidate in the 
period’s presidential election. This variable allows us to test the hypothesis that areas with a 
higher percentage of Republican voters are more likely to receive equipment. Blackit represents 
the percent of county residents that identify as black. Otherit represents the percent of county 
residents that identify as races other than white or black. Percent white is left out as the 
unobserved race regressor. These race variables allow us to test the Minority Threat Hypothesis. 
Incit represents median household annual income in county i during time period t, in dollars. I 
take the log of Incit because its residuals have a positively skewed distribution. OOit represents 
the percent of county households that are occupied by the property’s owner. This and household 
income are useful because they capture the relative socio-economic status of a county’s 
residents. Lastly α is the intercept and εit is the error term. In equation form, this model is: 
er_dummyit* = α + β0CRit-1 + β1ln(PEit ) + β2ln(Pop it) + β3Repubit + β4Blackit  +  
β5Otherit + β6ln(Incit) + β7OOit  + εit  (7) 
 In order to interpret the magnitude of each variable’s effect on the likelihood that a 
county receives military equipment, we must obtain average predictive marginal effects, which 
can be computed in Stata following the initial regression. These marginal effects can be 
interpreted as the effect of a one unit change in the independent variable on the probability of 
receiving equipment, if all variables are held at their mean values.  
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5.2 Tobit Model 
The second dependent variable that I model is the log of per capita dollars of equipment a 
county received from the 1033 Program, ERit. A linear OLS model is not well-suited for 
estimating per capita dollars of equipment received, due to the large number of counties that 
received a floor of $0 of equipment through the 1033 Program. Given that 37% of counties did 
not ever receive gear through the program, a standard OLS model would result in a downward-
biased estimate of the model’s coefficients and an upward-biased estimate of the model’s 
intercept. As such, I use the Tobit model, developed by James Tobin, which is a maximum 
likelihood estimator that is able to handle this type of clustering around a ‘limit.’ The Tobit 
model is consistent with data for which the amount of equipment received is non-negative for all 
counties and zero for a large fraction of counties.  
 To compute this estimation, the Tobit model defines a latent unobservable variable erit*, 
which linearly depends on the observable independent variables and a normally distributed error 
term, ε. While Tobit can execute both upper and lower censoring, we will only use a lower limit: 
$0. The variable erit* may be positive or negative, unlike the observed erit, which is always non-
negative. The observable dependent variable erit is computed from the latent variable as follows: 
erit = erit* if erit* > 0 
erit = 0 if  erit*  ≤ 0 
 The independent variables in my baseline Tobit specification in eq. 8 below are identical 
to the variables used in the baseline probit specification described in detail in the preceding 
section. To summarize, they are lagged crime rate CRit-1, log of police expenditures per arrest 
PEit, log of population Popit, percent of county voters who voted for the Republican candidate in 
national presidential elections Repubit, percent of county residents who are black Blackit, percent 
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of county residents who are other minority races (non-white and non-black) Otherit, log of 
median household income Incit, and percent of houses that are occupied by the house’s owner 
OOit.  
ERit = α + β0CRit-1 + β1ln(PEit ) + β2ln(Pop it) + β3Repubit + β4Blackit  +  β5Otherit + 
β6ln(Incit) + β7OOit  + εit  (8) 
erit= ln(ERit + 1)  (9) 
In eq. 9, we take the log of ERit to linearize the relationship and account for the positively 
skewed distribution of ERit’s residuals.  
erit* = α + β0CRit-1 + β1ln(PEit ) + β2ln(Pop it) + β3Repubit + β4Blackit  +  β5Otherit + 
β6ln(Incit) + β7OOit  + εit  (10) 
Eq. 10 is the final baseline Tobit equation that is used in my analysis. The interpretation of the β 
coefficients is somewhat unique for Tobit models. These coefficients represent a combination of 
two effects: (1) The change in erit* for counties that received equipment, weighted by the 
probability of receiving equipment; and (2) the change in the probability of receiving equipment, 
weighted by the expected value of erit* if the county received equipment. In order to compute the 
magnitude of these coefficients, we must obtain marginal effects. These average marginal effects 
represent the effect of a one unit change in the independent variable on the log of per capita 
dollars of equipment a county receives, if all independent variables are at their mean values.  
5.3 Potential Threats to Internal Validity: 
One potential threat to internal validity could be an omitted variable bias that results in a 
correlation between an independent variable and the error term. There could also be a threat from 
simultaneous causality bias in which the independent variables affect equipment allocation and 
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equipment allocation simultaneously affects the independent variables. I address these threats 
using an instrumental variable method commonly used in the literature. The two potential 
endogenous variables are crime and log of police expenditures per arrest. It is plausible that 
Crime, even though it is a lagged variable, is correlated with the error term. This could be due to 
reverse causality in which areas with high crime received more gear, which simultaneously 
affected the crime rate in a county. Similarly, police spending per arrest may be correlated with 
the error term due to endogeneity as well. There is also the possibility that there is an omitted 
variable that is reflected in the crime rate, police spending per arrest, and error term ε. For 
example, there may be unmeasured citizen attitudes towards policing (e.g. a preference for a very 
strong police force) that are reflected in both the police spending variable and the error term on 
dollars of equipment received. These unmeasured citizen and police officer attitudes could also 
affect the crime rate, if citizens commit more or less crimes due to these attitudes.  
To perform the instrumental variable method, we need two instruments that are correlated 
with Crime and Police Spending, but orthogonal to the dollars of equipment received through the 
1033 Program. I use the same instruments that Ajilore (2015), who based his instrumental 
variable method on the work of Sever and McSkimming (2004), use: percent of county residents 
that are males age 20-24 and percent of county households that are female-headed with no male 
head present. In theory, these instruments will not be correlated with the error term on dollars of 
equipment received, because they would not strongly affect the unmeasured citizen attitudes 
discussed above. On the other hand, because young males are associated with a large percentage 
of random violent crimes, percent males age 20-24 is expected to strongly affect an area’s crime 
rate and its amount of police expenditures (Conklin 1995). Also, as Vecchio and Roy (1997) 
find, a higher percent of female-headed households, which reflects the proportion of single 
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mothers in a county, are disproportionately found in lower-income areas where there may be a 
breakdown in social organization and thus increased crime and police expenditures. The validity 
of these instruments for my model are explained in Results section 7.3. Stata has instrumental 
variable functionality that uses a two-stage method. The first stage uses the two instruments to 
estimate the potentially endogenous variables; the second stage uses the estimated crime and 
police expenditures variables and other observed regressors to estimate the dependent variables 
er_dummy* and er*. Wald test of exogeneity p-values will also be provided in the results section 
to confirm the need for the instrumental variable method.  
In order to handle simultaneous causality issues in my model, I used a reduced form 
technique, in which a number of independent variables were dropped from the regressions. Due 
to high correlations with other independent variables, number of law enforcement agencies, 
percent of county living in urban areas, and police capital expenditures per arrest were dropped.  
5.4 Sub-Periods 
I perform my analysis for two separate sub-periods and one single full period. Sub-period 
1 spans from 1/6/06 – 5/09/10, sub-period 2 spans from 5/10/10 – 9/9/14, and the full period is 
from 2006-2014. This decision to break the analysis into sub-periods was made for a number of 
reasons. First, it improves the accuracy of the model by allowing for changes to the 1033 
Program over this time period. Because I hypothesized that the 1033 Program might have 
changed significantly between 2006 and 2014, particularly due to the influx of surplus gear 
returning from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, this sub-period technique allows me to analyze 
the program’s evolution. Secondly, it also allows me to perform a preliminary analysis of how 
crime rates changed from sub-period 1 to sub-period 2, particularly in counties that received a 
large amount of 1033 Program Equipment. For the full period specification, I use the same 
Rue 
25 
 
specifications in eq. 7 and eq. 10, but include an additional indicator variable i.period for sub-
period 1 vs. 2.  
5.5 State-Level Effects 
 In order to analyze state-level effects, I use the same probit and Tobit regression 
specifications described above, but with dummy variables representing each state. I perform this 
analysis relative to North Carolina to examine whether or not counties in other states are more 
likely to receive equipment or if they tend to receive more equipment than North Carolina 
counties.  
 
6. Data Sources 
6.1 Dependent Variable 
I obtained through National Public Radio a data set1 from the Law Enforcement Support 
Office (LESO) that lists each item donated by the 1033 Program to local law enforcement 
agencies. This data set includes the item name, the county to which it is given (listed by FIPS 
code), the quantity of items given, the original cost of the item for the Department of Defense, 
item identification numbers, shipping date, and other item classification data. The set contains all 
items distributed from 1/6/06 to 9/9/14. As was mentioned in section 5.4, I divide this data set 
into two sub-periods: sub-period 1: 1/6/06 – 5/09/10 and sub-period 2: 5/10/10 – 9/9/14. I 
summed the data to get per county total dollars of equipment received in each sub-period; lastly, 
I divided the dollars of equipment received by the county’s population to obtain per capita 
dollars of equipment received by the county for the Tobit model. A logged form was used to 
linearize the relationship and account for the variable’s skewed residuals. For the probit model’s 
                                                          
1 https://drive.google.com/folderview?id=0B03IIavLYTovdWg4NGtzSW9wb2c&usp=sharing; linked from 
http://www.npr.org/2014/09/02/342494225/mraps-and-bayonets-what-we-know-about-the-pentagons-1033-
program 
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dependent variable, I generated the dummy variable er_dummy that equals 0 if the per capita 
dollars of equipment received equals 0; er_dummy equals 1 if the per capita dollars of equipment 
received is greater than 0.  
6.2 Independent Variables 
Appendix B contains a table describing the sources and details of all of my independent 
variables, so in this section I will only present a brief overview of these sources. Crime rates per 
100 county residents were obtained from the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data, which is 
based off of the total number of arrests per year reported to the FBI by local law enforcement 
agencies. I use crime rates from 2005 for sub-period 1 and crime rates from 2009 for sub-period 
2. County-level population data were obtained from the 2010 U.S. Census. The log was used to 
account for the positively skewed distribution of population’s residuals.  
Police expenditures per arrest were calculated using police expenditure data from the 
2007 and 2012 U.S. Census of Local Governments, a complete survey that occurs every 5 years. 
I computed the dollars spent by each county on “Current Operations – Police Protection,” then 
divided by the number of arrests in 2005 and 2009 to obtain police expenditures per arrest. The 
logged form was again used to account for the positively skewed residuals.  
The percent of county voters that voted for Republican presidential candidates, John 
McCain in 2008 and Mitt Romney in 2012, were obtained from the National Atlas of the United 
States. I chose to use presidential election results as a proxy for a county’s political preferences 
because it is a more direct comparison across counties/regions and because this data is available 
for most counties.  
A number of variables were obtained from the American Community Survey, an annual 
Census Bureau survey that obtains complete coverage of all counties in its 5-year estimates. The 
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2009 values were used for sub-period 1 and the 2012 values were used for sub-period 2. Percent 
of county residents that identify as African American and percent of county residents that identify 
as other minority races (i.e. not white or not black) were obtained from the ACS 5-year estimates 
of “Race.” Median household income were obtained from the ACS 5-year estimates of “Selected 
Economic Characteristics.” The logged form of median income was taken to account for the 
positively skewed distribution of the variable’s residuals. Percent of county households that are 
occupied by the property’s owner were obtained from the ACS 5-year estimates of “Selected 
Housing Characteristics.” Percent of county residents that are males age 20-24 were obtained 
from the ACS 5-year estimates of “Age and Sex.” Percent of county households that are female-
headed with no male present and a family were obtained from the ACS 5-year estimates of 
“Selected Social Characteristics.”  
Percent of county residents that live in an urban MSA, which is used as a control when 
calculating the impact of receiving gear on crime rates, were obtained from the 2010 Census of 
Urban and Rural Classification and Urban Area Criteria. The two types of urban areas identified 
by the Census Bureau are: Urbanized Areas (UAs) of 50,000 or more people or Urban Clusters 
(UCs) of at least 2,500 and less than 50,000 people. Lastly, an official list of every FIPS county 
code was obtained from the U.S. Census Geography Reference. This ID variable ensured that 
every county was accounted for in the master data file. For states that do not have counties, FIPS 
codes are assigned to county-equivalents (townships, legislative districts, etc.).  
7. Results 
7.1 Analysis of Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for the estimation sample in sub-periods 1, 2, and the full period are 
included in Table 1. The table also includes p-values from a two-tailed t-test of the difference in 
Rue 
28 
 
means from sub-period 1 to sub-period 2. While there are many notable findings in these 
summary statistics, a few findings are of particular importance. First, there is a significant 
increase in the amount of equipment donated from sub-period 1 to sub-period 2. In sub-period 1, 
the mean log per capita equipment received by counties was .21. In sub-period 2, this mean 
increased significantly to .96, likely due to the reduced military need for equipment as the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan wound down in sub-period 2. In per capita dollar terms, this is an 
increase from $1.24 to $2.62. The maximum amount of equipment per capita received by a 
county increased from $226 in sub-period 1 to $574 in sub-period 2. Similarly, police spending 
per arrest increased significantly. In sub-period 1, the mean log of police expenditures per arrest 
was 8.15. In sub-period 2, this mean increased to 8.45. In dollar terms, this represents an increase 
from $3,482 to $4,678. This change is partially explained by the decrease in the number of 
arrests made from sub-period 1 to sub-period 2, but could also be explained by an increase in 
police spending over the periods.  
The relatively small size of the 1033 Program relative to overall police budgets raises 
concerns over whether this equipment would have a major impact on crime rates in a county. I 
still analyze the relationship, but one must consider the relatively small budget contributions of 
the 1033 Program equipment to overall police budgets.  
A correlation matrix amongst the variables is included in Table 2. While there is a small 
degree of correlation amongst some of the socio-demographic variables, none of the variables are 
strongly correlated.  
7.2 Conditional Probability of Receiving Gear by Period 
A conditional probability analysis was conducted to determine the likelihood that a 
county that received gear in sub-period 1 would also receive gear in sub-period 2. As shown in 
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the conditional probability Table 3, 73% of counties that received gear in sub-period 1 also 
received gear in sub-period 2. This is significantly higher than the 46.3% of counties that did not 
receive gear in sub-period 1, but did receive gear in sub-period 2 and the overall average of 63% 
of counties that received gear in sub-period 2. This result confirms that equipment allocation is, 
in some sense, related to historical equipment allocation levels. We cannot confirm causality, but 
the relationship is worth noting. If this is indeed a causal relationship, it could be due to 
administrators’ preferences for giving gear to counties that received gear in the past—or due to 
counties that received gear in sub-period 1 continuing to request and receive gear in sub-period 
2.   
7.3 OLS Estimation of Potentially Endogenous Variables in First Stage 
 Table 4 contains first-stage OLS regression results estimating the two potentially 
endogenous variables: crime per 100 residents and log of police expenditures per arrest. These 
results allow us to test the validity of Ajilore’s (2015) and Sever and McSkimming’s (2004) 
instruments: percent of county households that are female-headed and percent of county 
residents that are males age 20-24. The first instrument, percent of county households that are 
female-headed with no male present, had a statistically significant effect at the 1% level on crime 
and log of police expenditures per arrest in both sub-periods. The second instrument, percent of 
males age 20-24, had a significant effect on the log of police expenditures per arrest in both sub-
periods, but does not have a significant effect on crime per 100 residents. This result will bias the 
model’s consistency related to crime rate, so it suggests the need for stronger instruments in 
future research. Wald exogeneity test p-values are provided for my primary probit and Tobit 
regressions later in this section. If this p-value is significant, we reject the null hypothesis of no 
endogeneity of the potentially endogenous variables and confirm the need for the instrumental 
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variable method. If this p-value is not significant, there is not sufficient information to reject the 
null hypothesis, meaning the instrumental variable method is not required.  
7.4 Probit Model Results 
 Table 5 contains the second-stage probit regression results estimating er_dummy*, the 
latent likelihood that a county received 1033 Program equipment, for sub-periods 1 and 2. Table 
8 contains results for the full 2006-2014 specification, including a sub-period indicator variable.  
The marginal effects reported are average predictive marginal effects for er_dummy*. These 
margins are interpreted as the marginal change in the likelihood that er_dummy equals 1 (i.e. a 
county receives gear) for a one unit change in the covariate’s value, if all other covariates are 
held at their mean values. I will highlight a number of results that will be elaborated upon in 
Section 8.   
The coefficient on log of population was the most significant coefficient in both sub-
periods and the full period, with a marginal effect equal to .140 in sub-period 1 and .142 in sub-
period 2. This means that the likelihood that a county received gear increased by 14% when 
population increased by a factor of e=2.72. The coefficient of log of median household income 
was negative and significant at the 90% level in both sub-periods and the full period. In sub-
period 1, the marginal effect was -.140 and in sub-period 2, it was -.197. This implies that a one 
unit increase in the log of median household income reduced a county’s likelihood of receiving 
gear by 14% and 19.7% in sub-periods 1 and 2, respectively.  
 The effect of log of police expenditures per arrest was positive in both sub-periods and 
the full period, but not statistically significant in sub-period 2. Its marginal effect in sub-period 1 
was .200 and it was .147 in the full period specification. This indicates that counties with larger 
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police budgets were significantly more likely to receive gear than counties with smaller police 
budgets, which contradicts Hypothesis 1.   
The results also do not support the Minority Threat Hypothesis; the marginal effects of 
the two race variables were negative in both sub-periods, with the effect of percent other 
minorities being significant in sub-period 1 and the effect of percent black being significant in 
sub-period 2. In the full period specification in Table 6, percent black and percent other 
minorities have significant effects at the 95% level, with marginal effects of -.191 and -.193, 
respectively.   
And lastly, for the full period specification, the marginal effect of the period dummy 
2.dummy indicates that counties were 2.5% less likely to receive equipment in sub-period 2 than 
they were in sub-period 1, controlling for the other covariates.  
The Wald test p-values were .0019, .534, and .2208 for sub-period 1, sub-period 2, and 
the full period specifications, respectively. For sub-period 1, we can reject the null hypothesis of 
no endogeneity of the instrumental variables, confirming our need for the instrumental variable 
method. We cannot reject the null hypothesis for sub-period 2 and the full period, which 
indicates that the instrumental variable method is not required for these specifications.  
7.5 Tobit Model Results 
Table 7 contains the Tobit regression results estimating log of per capita dollars of 
equipment received for sub-period 1 and sub-period 2. Table 8 contains results for the full period 
2006-2014 specification, including a period indicator variable. The marginal effects shown are 
the predictive marginal effects. These effects are interpreted as the marginal change in the 
expected log of per capita dollars of equipment received due to a one unit change in the 
independent variable, if all other covariates are held at their mean values.  
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Similar to the probit results, the coefficient of log of population was positive in each sub-
period and the full period, with marginal effects of .075, .206, and .143, respectively. This means 
that a one unit increase in the log of population resulted in increases of $1.07, $1.22, and $1.15 
in the expected per capita dollars of equipment a county received in sub-period 1, sub-period 2, 
and the full period, respectively. The coefficient of log of median income was also significant 
and negative in sub-period 1, sub-period 2, and the full period, with marginal effects of -.167, -
.800, and -.385, respectively. This indicates that higher-income areas received significantly less 
gear than lower-income areas.  
The effect of log of police expenditures per arrest was also significant in sub-period 1, 
sub-period 2, and the full period, with marginal effects of .168, .337, and .228, respectively. This 
is an interesting result that contradicts Hypothesis 1 and reveals that areas that spent more on 
police also received more equipment from the 1033 Program.   
Interestingly, the marginal effect of crime was positive in all three time period 
specifications, but only significant in sub-period 2 and the full-period. Its marginal effect was 
.296 in sub-period 2 and .124 in sub-period 2. This confirms Hypothesis 4, which states that 
areas with higher relative crime rates will receive more gear than areas with lower relative crime 
rates. The effect of percent Black was also significant in sub-period 2 and the full period, with 
marginal effects of -1.047 and -.365, which contradicts the Minority Threat Hypothesis and 
aligns with Ajilore’s (2015) findings. Given the insignificance of the percent other minority 
variable’s coefficients in all three periods, the model does not conclusively disprove the Minority 
Threat Hypothesis. 
The effect of percent Republican voters was positive in each sub-period and the full 
period, but only becomes significant in sub-period 2 and the full period, with marginal effects of 
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.563 and .225, respectively. This supports Hypothesis 3, which states that areas with a larger 
share of Republican voters will receive more equipment, perhaps due to Republican voters’ 
tendency to prefer a stronger police force.  
And lastly, for the full period specification, the marginal effect of the period dummy is 
.474, which is significant at the 99% level. This supports the hypothesis that the 1033 Program 
expanded significantly from sub-period 1 to sub-period 2, perhaps as more surplus equipment 
was available from the conclusion of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
The Wald test p-values were .193 for sub-period 1, .0000 for sub-period 2, and .014 for 
the full period. We can reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity and confirm the need for the 
instrumental variable method for sub-period 2 and the full period, but not for sub-period 1.  
7.6 State-Level Effects 
 As was outlined in Section 5.5, an analysis of state-level effects relative to North 
Carolina was performed for both the probit and Tobit models using similar specifications, but 
with the addition of state dummy variables. Summary statistics for log of dollars of equipment 
received and er_dummy by state are provided in Table 9 for each sub-period. While the mean log 
dollars of equipment received increased from sub-period 1 to sub-period 2 for every state except 
Mississippi, the change in mean er_dummy, interpreted as the percent of counties in a state that 
received 1033 Program, are mixed. In North Carolina, the mean er_dummy decreased 
significantly from 91% in sub-period 1 to 54% in sub-period 2. The mean percent of counties 
that received gear in Missouri, on the other hand, increased dramatically from 24% in sub-period 
1 to 78% in sub-period 2. While these changes could be a result of many state-level factors, it is 
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possible that they are due to: 1) changes in the state coordinators’2 management of the state’s 
surplus program; 2) Changes in the military’s distribution of gear amongst its military bases and 
surplus equipment storage sites (e.g. closing a base in a state could result in less surplus 
equipment available to law enforcement agencies in the state); or 3) Changes in citizen 
preferences that cause law enforcement officials to request more or less gear.  
Of the 3 probit regressions and 3 Tobit regressions performed for the different periods, 
the only one that obtained maximum-likelihood convergence in Stata was the Tobit specification 
in sub-period 2. The coefficients and marginal effects estimating log dollars of equipment 
received for sub-period 2, relative to North Carolina, are presented in Table 10. The marginal 
effects on the state variables are interpreted as the difference in log dollars of equipment received 
for a county in that state versus a county in North Carolina. The results confirm that state-level 
effects versus North Carolina significantly impacted the amount of equipment received in this 
sub-period. The statistically significant and positive marginal effects on the majority of state 
variables indicate that counties in other states tended to receive more gear than counties in North 
Carolina in sub-period 2, with Alabama having the highest marginal effect of 1.575. The 
inability to obtain MLE convergence for the other state-level specifications indicates that there 
are multiple optimal solutions for these regressions.  
7.7 Impact of Receiving Equipment on Crime Rates 
Table 11 contains OLS regression results estimating how crime rates changed from sub-
period 1 to sub-period 2 in counties that were in the upper quartile of log of per capita dollars of 
equipment received. The specification controls for the following independent variables: percent 
                                                          
2 For a full list of 1033 Program state coordinators, see: 
http://www.dispositionservices.dla.mil/leso/Pages/statecoordinatorlist.aspx 
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of county residents living in urban areas, percent Black, percent other minorities, log of median 
household income, percent owner-occupied households, percent males age 20-24, and percent 
female-headed households. We are mostly interested in the interaction term of period and 
treatment, which was .130, but not significant. This result suggests that being in the upper 
quartile of amount of equipment received did not significantly impact crime rates in the county. 
This does not necessarily confirm a lack of causation, but it does suggest that there is not a 
significant relationship between receiving a large amount of equipment and changing crime 
rates. Also, because of how small the 1033 Program is relative to law enforcement agencies’ 
overall budgets, it would seem unlikely that receiving equipment would dramatically improve 
crime rates in a region. This result is fascinating and worth considering, but not particularly 
meaningful without proof of a lack of causality. 
8. Discussion and Conclusion 
8.1 Discussion of Results: 
There are a number of important insights that can be drawn from the results described 
above. First, it seems that larger population size is the variable that most significantly and 
consistently increased the instance and amount of equipment a county received. Given that the 
dependent variable was already in per capita terms in the Tobit specification, this result means 
that high population areas got even more gear relative to less populated areas.  
 Second, these results generally do not support the Minority Threat Hypothesis and 
instead indicate that areas with a higher percentage of black and other minority race residents 
tended to receive less gear and tended to be less likely to receive gear than areas with smaller 
minority populations. These results align with Ajilore’s (2015) results, which found a similar 
negative relationship between minority population size and the number of mine-resistant vehicles 
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received from the 1033 Program. If the Minority Threat Hypothesis were true, one would expect 
the majority to feel more ‘threatened’ in areas with proportionally larger minority populations—
and possibly to respond by seeking out more surplus equipment. One possible explanation for 
why counties with large minority populations got less gear might be that these minority groups 
collectively advocated for a more limited police force (i.e. less militarization) to avoid the 
discrimination predicted by the Minority Threat Hypothesis.  
 Third, though with varying significance levels, the generally positive marginal effects on 
log of police expenditures per arrest imply that counties with relatively larger per capita police 
budgets tended to receive more gear and be more likely to receive gear than police departments 
with smaller budgets. This is an unexpected result that contradicts the hypothesis that police 
departments with smaller budgets would receive more free 1033 equipment to compensate for 
their limited budgets. An alternative explanation for this relationship is that counties with large 
police budgets have the financial resources to afford the costs associated with acquiring 1033 
Program gear (e.g. costs for equipment transportation, maintenance, storage, officer training 
programs, etc.). It is also possible that citizens in counties with large police budgets implicitly 
prefer a strong police presence, beyond the political preferences captured in percent Republican, 
and their police administrators will thus request more surplus gear than other areas.  
 Fourth, the effect of percent Republican voters, which was not significant in either model 
in sub-period 1, became significant and positive in the probit and Tobit results for sub-period 2. 
This means that areas with a higher proportion of Republican voters did not significantly affect 
the likelihood or amount of equipment received from 2006-2010, but significantly increased the 
likelihood that a county received equipment and the amount of equipment it received from 2010-
2014. This result supports Hypothesis 2, which states that areas with a higher proportion of 
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Republican voters will tend to receive more 1033 Program equipment due to Republican voters’ 
preference for a relatively stronger police force (Jacob and Helms 1997).  
One possible explanation for why this effect only became significant in sub-period 2 
relates to major political changes following the 2010 U.S. midterm elections. In the 2010 
elections, the Republican Party gained a net 63 seats in the House of Representatives, thereby 
recapturing the majority in the House.3 The party also gained from Democrats a net: six seats in 
the Senate,4 six state governorships,5 and 680 seats in state legislatures.6 It is thus possible that 
the widespread increase in the Republican Party’s strength caused political changes at the state 
and national level that significantly affected the distribution of the surplus military equipment, 
perhaps making political factors a more significant determinant of receiving gear. Also, given the 
significance of the marginal effects of the state variables in Table 10, it is possible that state 
politics did affect the amount of equipment received by an area. We do not have sufficient 
information to isolate the exact cause of the increase in the significance of the political variable, 
but it could be explored in future research on the subject.  
 And lastly, the marginal effects of crime were positive, but not generally significant. 
While this could indicate that crime truly did not affect the probability that a county received 
gear or the amount of gear it received, it could also be a result of the inconsistent first-stage 
instrumental variable estimations of crime. As is discussed in the next section, in future research, 
economists could improve the accuracy of the first-stage by using different specifications with 
additional instruments. 
                                                          
3 http://elections.nytimes.com/2010/results/house 
4 http://elections.nytimes.com/2010/results/senate 
5 http://elections.nytimes.com/2010/results/governor 
6 http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/03/news/la-pn-state-legislatures-20101104 
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8.2 Possible Issues and Future Research Possibilities:  
One potentially concerning feature of these results is their inconsistency across periods. 
Although this could be due to specification issues or omitted variable biases, it could also be due 
to significant changes in the way the 1033 Program was run between the two periods. As was 
discussed above, the latter explanation seems more likely, given the political changes following 
the 2010 election and significant expansion in the amount of equipment donated in sub-period 2. 
In future research, economists could break the data into more sub-periods (annually) to see if, 
when, and to what extent the 1033 Program has changed over time.  
As was mentioned above, the most concerning aspect of this model is the inconsistent 
first-stage estimation of crime rates. In future research, economists could consider using different 
explanatory variables or instruments to estimate crime rates. This would result in a more accurate 
estimation of crime, which would also result in more accurate estimations of the second stage 
dependent variables.  
In future research, economists could investigate the causes of the sharp increase in gear 
donated by the 1033 Program over this time period. In order to evaluate the military-industrial 
complex and increased significance of percent Republican in sub-period 2 they could also 
investigate whether regions with Congressmen or Senators on the Armed Services Committees 
tended to receive more gear than areas without representation on these committees. On a related 
note, researchers could further investigate state-level effects, political and otherwise, and the 
reasons for which some states received more gear than other states ceteris paribus. They could 
also attempt to better capture the geographical proximity of LESO Disposition Sites, where gear 
is stored and requested by law enforcement officials. And lastly, building off of Ajilore’s (2015) 
paper, economists could analyze more specific dependent variables like the amount of vehicles, 
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aircraft, or weapons that a county received through the program. They could similarly include 
more specific crime rates (e.g. drug crimes or violent crime) as independent variables.  
8.3 Conclusion 
The events of Ferguson in 2014 raised important questions about the rapid militarization 
of local law enforcement officers over the past decade in America. While this paper begins to 
answer some of these questions, further research is needed to build on this analysis and improve 
our understanding of the program’s allocation processes and causal effectiveness in reducing 
crime and improving public safety.  
 
 
 
  
Rue 
40 
 
Works Cited 
201, 104th Cong., Http://www.dispositionservices.dla.mil/leso/Documents/LESO%20Forms/ 
FY1997NDAA.pdf 2639 (1996) (enacted).  
"About the 1033 Program." Defense Logistics Agency - Law Enforcement Support Office. 
Accessed September 22, 2014. http://www.dispositionservices.dla.mil/leso/pages 
/default.aspx.  
Ajilore, Olugbenga. "The Militarization of Local Law Enforcement: Is Race A Factor?" Applied 
Economics Letters 22 (January 13, 2015). Accessed February 10, 2015. 
Boettke, Peter J., Christopher J. Coyne, and Abigail R. Hall. "Keep Off the Grass: The 
Economics of Prohibition and US Drug Policy." (2013). 
Conklin, J. (1995). Criminology (5th ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon. 
Denbeaux, Mark and Dack, Jeremy and Gallivan, Dakota and Morgan, Lucas and Stepp, Jared 
and Wirtshafter, Joshua, Costs and Consequences of Arming America's Law 
Enforcement with Combat Equipment (September 5, 2014). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2492321 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2492321 
Guillamón, Ma. Dolores, Francisco Bastida, and Bernardino Benito. "The Electoral Budget 
Cycle on Municipal Police Expenditure." European Journal of Law and Economics, 
2011, 447-69. Accessed October 17, 2014. 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10657-011-9271-6#page-1. 
Hall, Abigail R., and Christopher J. Coyne. "The Militarization of US Domestic Policing." The 
Independent Review 17, no. 4 (2013): 485-504. 
Rue 
41 
 
Jackson, P.I. (1989) Minority Group Threat, Crime, and Policing: Social Context and Social 
Control, Greenwood Publishing Group, New York. 
Jacobs, David, and Ronald E. Helms. "Testing Coercive Explanations for Order: The 
Determinants of Law Enforcement Strength over Time." Social Forces 75.4 (1997): 
1361-382. Oxford Journals. Web. 12 Nov. 2014. 
<http://sf.oxfordjournals.org/content/75/4/1361.full.pdf>. 
Kraska, Peter B. Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System: The Changing Roles of the 
Armed Forces and the Police. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2001. 
Kraska, Peter B. "Militarization and policing—Its relevance to 21st century police." Policing 
(2007): pam065. 
Landler, Mark. "Obama Offers New Standards on Police Gear." The New York Times. 
December 01, 2014. Accessed December 01, 2014. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/us/politics/obama-to-toughen-standards-on-police-
use-of-military-gear.html. 
Levitt, Steven D. "Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on 
Crime." American Economic Review 87, no. 3 (June 1997): 270-91. Accessed December 
1, 2014.  
Marvell, Thomas B., and Carlisle E. Moody. "Specification Problems, Police Levels, And Crime 
Rates*." Criminology 34, no. 4 (1996): 609-46. Accessed December 1, 2014. 
doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.1996.tb01221.x. 
Sever, Brion, and Michael J. McSkimming. "The Impact of Racial Composition and Other 
County Characteristics on the Size of Sheriff's Departments: A New Analysis of Police 
Rue 
42 
 
Force Growth." Criminal Justice Policy Review 15.4 (2004): 466-512. Sage Journals. 
Web. 15 Mar. 2015. 
Tomislav V. Kovandzic, John J Sloan, “Police levels and crime rates revisited: A county-level 
analysis from Florida (1980–1998),” Journal of Criminal Justice, Volume 30, Issue 1, 
January–February 2002, Pages 65-76, ISSN 0047-2352, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-
2352(01)00123-4. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047235201001234 
Vecchio, N., & Roy, K. (1997). Poverty, female-headed households, and sustainable economic 
development. Westport, CT: Greenwood. 
Zhao, J., Ren, L., & Lovrich, N. P. (2010). Budgetary support for police services in US 
municipalities: Comparing political culture, socioeconomic characteristics and 
incrementalism as rival explanations for budget share allocation to police. Journal of 
Criminal Justice, 38(3), 266–275. 
  
Rue 
43 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Estimation Sample by sub-period 
Sample Mean Sample Mean p-value Sample Mean
2006-2010 2010-2014 two-tailed t test 2006-2014
Log of $ of Equipment Received 0.213 0.961 0.000*** 0.589
(0.503) (1.329) (1.074)       
er_dummy 0.631 0.633 0.860 0.632
(0.483) (0.482) (0.482)       
Log Population 10.222 10.235 0.723 10.229
(1.414) (1.423) (1.419)       
% Republican 0.574 0.600 0.000*** 0.587
(0.137) (0.148) (0.143)       
% Black 0.088 0.091 0.568 0.090
(0.146) (0.149) (0.147)       
% Other Minorities 0.069 0.068 0.498 0.068
(0.090) (0.087) (0.089)       
Log Median Income 3.732 3.783 0.000*** 3.758
(0.246) (0.243) (0.246)       
% Owner Occupied Houses 0.733 0.727 0.003**  0.730
(0.073) (0.076) (0.075)       
Crime Per 100 Residents 4.409 4.014 0.000*** 4.211
(2.558) (2.272) (2.426)       
Log Police Spending per Arrest 8.155 8.451 0.000*** 8.304
(0.804) (0.744) (0.789)       
% Males Age 20-24 0.069 0.065 0.000*** 0.067
(0.030) (0.028) (0.029)       
% Female-Headed Households 0.110 0.112 0.026**  0.111
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044)       
Observations 2891 2914 5805
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Log of dollars of equipment received is in per capita terms. 
Er_dummy equals 1 if amount received > $0; equals 0 otherwise. Sub-period 1 is from 2006-2010; sub-
period 2 is from 2010-2014.  P-values are from a two-tailed t-test of the mean difference of each variable 
by sub-period. Statistically significant p-values indicate that the mean is significantly different between 
sub-period 1 and sub-period 2. The last column contains summary statistics for the entire time period: 2006-
2014.   
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Table 2: Correlation among Variables in Estimation Sample 
 Log     Log Log % % % Log % % 
 $ ER er_dummy Crime Pol. Spend Pop. Repub. Black Other Inc. Owner Occ. Young Men 
Log of $ of Equipment Received 1.00                     
er_dummy 0.42 1.00           
Crime Per 100 Residents 0.02 0.05 1.00          
Log Police Spending per Arrest 0.04 0.01 -0.59 1.00         
Log Population 0.08 0.35 0.23 -0.16 1.00        
% Republican 0.04 -0.12 -0.14 -0.02 -0.36 1.00       
% Black 0.02 0.02 0.20 -0.07 0.13 -0.34 1.00      
% Other 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.14 -0.21 -0.12 1.00     
Log Median Income 0.00 0.15 -0.11 0.26 0.41 -0.05 -0.27 0.08 1.00    
% Owner Occupied Houses -0.06 -0.09 -0.31 0.04 -0.29 0.32 -0.27 -0.32 0.13 1.00   
% Males Age 20-24 -0.02 0.08 0.17 -0.15 0.26 -0.22 0.15 0.10 -0.06 -0.52 1.00 
% Female-Headed Households 0.07 0.05 0.32 -0.24 0.26 -0.34 0.74 0.21 -0.37 -0.40 0.16 
 
Note: Standard correlation matrix of dependent variables, independent variables, and instruments.  
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Table 3: Conditional Probability of Receiving Equipment across Periods 
 
 
Did NOT receive gear in  
sub-period 2 
 
Did receive gear in  
sub-period 2 
 
Total 
Did not got gear in sub-period 1 (lagged) 
 
613 529 1,142 
53.7% 46.3% 100.0% 
Got gear in sub-period 1 (lagged) 539 1,459 1,998 
 27.0% 73.0% 100.0% 
Total 1,152 1,988 3,140 
 36.7% 63.3% 100.0% 
 
Notes: Table shows percent of counties that received equipment (i.e. er_dummy > 0) in each sub-period, 
conditional upon previous sub-period. Rows represent sub-period 1; columns represent sub-period 2. 73% 
of counties that received equipment in sub-period 1 also received equipment in sub-period 2, compared to 
46.3% of counties that did not receive gear in sub-period 1, but did receive it in sub-period 2.   
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Table 4: First-Stage OLS Regression of Potentially Endogenous Variables 
Crime Per 100 Log of Police Spending per Arrest
2006-2010 2010-2014 2006-2010 2010-2014
% Males Age 20-24 -1.098 0.636 -3.467*** -3.921***
(1.789)              (1.765)              (0.534)              (0.645)              
% Female-Headed Households 14.840*** 13.230*** -6.160*** -6.086***
(2.458)              (2.004)              (0.655)              (0.640)              
Log Population 0.286*** 0.234*** -0.161*** -0.149***
(0.052)              (0.043)              (0.015)              (0.015)              
% Republican 0.698 0.707**  -0.718*** -0.663***
(0.437)              (0.353)              (0.113)              (0.106)              
% Black -1.700*** -0.577 1.460*** 1.252***
(0.619)              (0.512)              (0.169)              (0.160)              
% Other Minorities -2.182**  -1.672**  0.951*** 0.575***
(1.105)              (0.658)              (0.203)              (0.203)              
Log Median Income -1.019*** -0.219 1.106*** 0.823***
(0.260)              (0.219)              (0.076)              (0.070)              
% Owner Occupied Houses -5.688*** -7.454*** -1.754*** -1.064***
(0.990)              (0.854)              (0.262)              (0.317)              
Constant 7.798*** 6.066*** 8.085*** 8.813***
(1.085)              (1.073)              (0.339)              (0.369)              
Observations 2,947 2,944 2,892 2,915
R-squared 0.134 0.206 0.208 0.211
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. OLS estimation of two potentially endogenous variables, 
Crime and log of police spending per arrest on instruments and other covariates. Instruments are percent 
of county residents that are males age 20-24 and percent of households that are female-headed family 
with no male present. Sub-period 1 from 2006-2010 and sub-period 2 from 2010-2014.   
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Table 5: Probit Regression Results of Likelihood of Receiving Gear in Sub-Periods 1 and 2 
2006-2010 2010-2014
Coefficients Marginal FX Coefficients Marginal FX
Crime Per 100 0.024 0.008 0.135 0.044
(0.073)      (0.023)         (0.182)           (0.058)      
Log Police Spending per Arrest 0.624*** 0.200*** 0.308 0.100
(0.195)      (0.061)         (0.236)           (0.075)      
Log Population 0.438*** 0.140*** 0.436*** 0.142***
(0.029)      (0.008)         (0.073)           (0.026)      
% Republican -0.309 -0.099 0.410*    0.134*    
(0.232)      (0.075)         (0.226)           (0.074)      
% Black -0.119 -0.038 -1.085*** -0.353***
(0.235)      (0.075)         (0.346)           (0.107)      
% Other Minorities -0.973*** -0.312*** -0.175 -0.057
(0.332)      (0.106)         (0.315)           (0.102)      
Log Median Income -0.436*    -0.140*    -0.606*** -0.197***
(0.235)      (0.074)         (0.235)           (0.076)      
% Owner Occupied Houses 0.609 0.195 0.807 0.263
(0.716)      (0.229)         (1.505)           (0.486)      
Constant -7.851*** -5.656*    
(1.913)      (2.894)           
Observations 2,891 2,891 2,914 2,914
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Second-stage results of robust maximum-likelihood probit 
regression of er_dummy, which equals 1 if a county receives > $0 of gear in the sub-period and 0 
otherwise. Two instruments, percent males age 20-24 and percent female-headed households were used to 
estimate the potentially endogenous variables: Crime and log of police spending per arrest. First-stage 
results not shown. Marginal effects are predictive margins. They are interpreted as the change in 
er_dummy, the likelihood a county receives gear from the 1033 Program, predicted from a one unit 
change in the independent variable, holding all other covariates at their mean values.   
Rue 
48 
 
Table 6: Probit Regression Results of Likelihood of Receiving Gear in Full Period 
2006-2014
Coefficients Marginal FX
Crime Per 100 0.073 0.024
(0.052)      (0.017)      
Log Police Spending per Arrest 0.446*** 0.147***
(0.154)      (0.049)      
Log Population 0.440*** 0.145***
(0.027)      (0.008)      
% Republican 0.073 0.024
(0.167)      (0.055)      
% Black -0.579*** -0.191***
(0.167)      (0.054)      
% Other Minorities -0.587**  -0.193**  
(0.234)      (0.077)      
Log Median Income -0.460**  -0.151**  
(0.183)      (0.059)      
% Owner Occupied Houses 0.524 0.172
(0.527)      (0.172)      
2.period -0.077*    -0.025*    
(0.044)      (0.014)      
Constant -6.689***
(1.408)      
Observations 5,805 5,805
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Second-stage results of robust maximum-likelihood probit 
regression of er_dummy, which equals 1 if a county receives > $0 of gear in the full period and 0 
otherwise. Two instruments, percent males age 20-24 and percent female-headed households were used to 
estimate the potentially endogenous variables: Crime and log of police spending per arrest. First-stage 
results not shown. Marginal effects are predictive margins. They are interpreted as the change in 
er_dummy, the likelihood a county receives gear from the 1033 Program, predicted from a one unit 
change in the independent variable, holding all other covariates at their mean values. 2.period is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 for sub-period 2 and 0 for sub-period 1. Its marginal effect represents the 
change in lner associated with sub-period 2 (from 2010 to 2014). 
.   
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Table 7: Tobit Results of Amount of Equipment Received in Sub-Periods 1 and 2 
2006-2010 2010-2014
Coefficients Marginal FX Coefficients Marginal FX
Crime Per 100 0.030 0.015 0.505*** 0.296***
(0.040)              (0.020)              (0.082)              (0.049)              
Log Police Spending per Arrest 0.336*** 0.168*** 0.574**  0.337**  
(0.129)              (0.064)              (0.264)              (0.155)              
Log Population 0.150*** 0.075*** 0.351*** 0.206***
(0.023)              (0.012)              (0.053)              (0.031)              
% Republican 0.030 0.015 0.959*** 0.563***
(0.136)              (0.068)              (0.356)              (0.209)              
% Black 0.077 0.039 -1.783*** -1.047***
(0.138)              (0.069)              (0.410)              (0.241)              
% Other Minorities -0.244 -0.122 0.110 0.065
(0.203)              (0.102)              (0.487)              (0.286)              
Log Median Income -0.334**  -0.167**  -1.363*** -0.800***
(0.157)              (0.079)              (0.331)              (0.195)              
% Owner Occupied Houses 0.387 0.194 4.192*** 2.462***
(0.379)              (0.190)              (0.870)              (0.512)              
Constant -3.447*** -8.339***
(1.107)              (2.407)              
Observations 2,891 2,891 2,914 2,914
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Second-stage results of robust maximum-likelihood Tobit 
regression of log of per capita dollars of equipment received in sub-periods 1 and 2. The Tobit 
specification censors at a lower limit of $0, which isolates the estimations for counties that received 
equipment from those that did not. Two instruments, percent males age 20-24 and percent female-headed 
households were used to estimate the potentially endogenous variables: Crime and log of police spending 
per arrest. First-stage results not shown. Marginal effects are predictive margins. They are interpreted as 
the change in lner, the log of per capita dollars of equipment received, predicted from a one unit change 
in the independent variable, holding all other covariates at their mean values.  
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Table 8: Tobit Results of Amount of Equipment Received in Full Period 
2006-2014 2006-2014
Coefficients Marginal FX
Crime Per 100 0.225*** 0.124***
(0.082)      (0.045)     
Log Police Spending per Arrest 0.414** 0.228**  
(0.203)      (0.112)     
Log Population 0.260*** 0.143***
(0.035)      (0.019)     
% Republican 0.408**  0.225**  
(0.201)      (0.111)     
% Black -0.662*** -0.365***
(0.231)      (0.127)     
% Other Minorities -0.240 -0.132
(0.283)      (0.156)     
Log Median Income -0.698*** -0.385***
(0.228)      (0.126)     
% Owner Occupied Houses 1.802*** 0.993***
(0.691)      (0.382)     
2.period 0.862*** 0.474***
(0.054)      (0.031)     
Constant -6.154***
(1.945)      
Observations 5,805 5,805
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Second-stage results of robust maximum-likelihood Tobit 
regression of log of per capita dollars of equipment received in the full period from 2006-2014. The Tobit 
specification censors at a lower limit of $0, which isolates the estimations for counties that received 
equipment from those that did not. Two instruments, percent males age 20-24 and percent female-headed 
households were used to estimate the potentially endogenous variables: Crime and log of police spending 
per arrest. First-stage results not shown. Marginal effects are predictive margins. They are interpreted as 
the change in lner, the log of per capita dollars of equipment received, predicted from a one unit change 
in the independent variable, holding all other covariates at their mean values. 2.period is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 for sub-period 2 and 0 for sub-period 1. Its marginal effect represents the change in 
lner associated with sub-period 2 (from 2010 to 2014). 
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Mean log($ Gear Received) Mean er_dummy
2006-2010 2010-2014 2006-2010 2010-2014
Alabama 0.59 2.15 74.6% 83.6%
Alaska 0.02 0.07 23.1% 7.7%
Arkansas 0.19 1.07 59.5% 79.7%
California 0.43 1.34 91.4% 87.9%
Colorado 0.26 1.44 78.1% 82.8%
Florida 0.57 0.92 88.1% 76.1%
Georgia 0.33 1.46 78.0% 70.4%
Hawaii 0.00 0.22 25.0% 25.0%
Idaho 0.16 1.26 61.4% 72.7%
Ill inois 0.21 1.40 74.5% 68.6%
Indiana 0.32 1.15 85.9% 81.5%
Iowa 0.07 0.37 55.6% 56.6%
Kansas 0.11 0.44 48.6% 61.0%
Kentucky 0.12 1.63 28.3% 73.3%
Louisiana 0.27 0.88 65.6% 53.1%
Maine 0.27 1.65 100.0% 93.8%
Maryland&Delaware 0.26 0.99 92.6% 77.8%
Mass.&Connecticut 0.08 0.95 81.8% 90.9%
Michigan 0.21 1.03 79.5% 67.5%
Minnesota 0.28 0.41 94.3% 48.3%
Mississippi 0.10 0.07 61.0% 20.7%
Missouri 0.18 1.03 24.3% 78.3%
Montana 0.65 1.24 75.0% 37.5%
Nebraska 0.05 0.08 31.2% 18.3%
Nevada 0.37 1.07 64.7% 58.8%
New Hampshire 0.07 1.43 100.0% 80.0%
New Jersey 0.05 0.61 81.0% 47.6%
New Mexico 0.33 2.35 45.8% 85.4%
New York 0.01 0.79 22.6% 75.8%
North Carolina 0.28 0.50 91.0% 54.0%
North Dakota 0.21 0.85 77.4% 67.9%
Ohio 0.32 1.08 94.3% 90.9%
Oklahoma 0.08 1.11 19.5% 74.0%
Oregon 0.20 0.71 63.9% 52.8%
Pennsylvania 0.03 0.18 41.8% 56.7%
Rhode Island 0.59 1.49 80.0% 100.0%
South Carolina 0.42 1.44 69.6% 78.3%
South Dakota 0.14 0.28 59.1% 28.8%
Tennessee 0.42 2.08 81.1% 78.9%
Texas 0.10 0.93 42.9% 55.9%
Utah 0.11 0.40 79.3% 58.6%
Vermont 0.06 0.74 92.9% 64.3%
Virginia&DC 0.19 0.60 66.4% 49.6%
Washington 0.30 1.32 87.2% 84.6%
West Virginia 0.25 0.63 63.6% 40.0%
Wisconsin 0.16 0.62 83.3% 62.5%
Wyoming 0.27 1.11 82.6% 60.9%   
Table 9: Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables by State 
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Table 10: Tobit Results of Amount of Gear Received in Sub-Period 2 with State Effects 
Coefficients Marginal FX State Coefficients Marginal FX
Crime Per 100 0.251 0.151  Alabama 2.405*** 1.575***
(0.161)      (0.097)       Arkansas 1.369*** 0.753***
Log Police Spend. per Arrest 0.426 0.256  California 1.167*** 0.616***
(0.491)      (0.295)       Colorado 1.619*** 0.935***
Log Population 0.285*** 0.171***  Georgia 1.809*** 1.081***
(0.060)      (0.036)       Hawaii -0.960 -0.282
% Republican 0.228 0.137  Idaho 1.473*** 0.827***
(0.440)      (0.264)       Il l inois 1.087*     0.563
% Black -0.904 -0.543  Indiana 1.600*** 0.921***
(0.570)      (0.342)       Iowa 0.336 0.145
% Other Minorities -0.350 -0.210  Kansas 0.646**  0.302**  
(0.713)      (0.428)       Kentucky 2.107*** 1.321***
Log Median Income -0.477 -0.286  Louisiana 0.457 0.204
(0.377)      (0.227)       Maine 1.970*** 1.209***
% Owner Occupied 2.130 1.279  Maryland&Delaware 0.677*     0.319
(1.370)      (0.823)       Mass.&Connecticut 0.467 0.209
Constant -7.766  Michigan 1.037*** 0.532***
(4.907)       Minnesota -0.010 -0.004
Observations 2,914 2,914  Mississippi -1.269*** -0.337***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  Missouri 1.412*** 0.784***
 Montana 1.283**  0.693*     
 Nebraska -0.837**  -0.256**   
 Nevada 0.730 0.348
 New Hampshire -0.209 -0.077
 New Jersey -0.339 -0.121
 New Mexico&Arizona 2.232*** 1.427***
 New York 0.958*** 0.483**  
 North Dakota 1.416*** 0.786***
 Ohio 1.284*** 0.694***
 Oklahoma 1.423*** 0.791***
 Oregon 0.450 0.200
 Pennsylvania -0.004 -0.001
 South Carolina 1.667*** 0.971***
 South Dakota 0.138 0.056
 Tennessee 2.007*** 1.239***
 Texas 0.813*** 0.396***
 Utah 0.017 0.007
 Vermont 1.091*     0.566*     
 Virginia&DC 0.364 0.158
 Washington 1.426*** 0.794***
 West Virginia 0.315 0.136
 Wisconsin 0.019 0.008
 Wyoming 0.766 0.369   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Second-stage 
results of robust maximum-likelihood Tobit 
regression of log of per capita dollars of equipment 
received in sub-period 2 (from 2010-2014) relative 
to North Carolina. The Tobit specification censors 
at a lower limit of $0. Two instruments, percent 
males age 20-24 and percent female-headed 
households were used to estimate the potentially 
endogenous variables: Crime and log of police 
spending per arrest. First-stage results not shown. 
Marginal effects are predictive margins. They are 
interpreted as the change in lner, the log of per 
capita dollars of equipment received, predicted from 
a one unit change in the independent variable, 
holding all other covariates at their mean values. 
The marginal effects on the state indicator variables 
reflect the change in lner predicted for a county in 
the given state, relative to a county in North 
Carolina.  
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Table 11: OLS Results of Crime Rate on Being in Upper Quartile of Amount of Gear 
Received 
2006-2014
Coeffcients
Interaction of period and treatment 0.130
(0.127)          
=1 if county in upper  quartile of $ equipment received -0.083
(-0.097)   
Period Dummy: =0 if period 1; =1 if period 2 -0.866***
(-0.069)   
% Urban 1.874***
(0.186)          
% Black -1.405***
(0.419)          
% Other Minorities -2.155***
(0.642)          
Log Median Income -1.206***
(0.182)          
% Owner Occupied Houses -5.258***
(0.971)          
% Males Age 20-24 -3.013**  
(1.330)          
% Female-Headed Households 11.433***
(1.492)          
Constant 11.254***
(0.875)          
Observations 5,919
R-squared 0.193
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. OLS regression results estimating the change in crime 
rates from sub-period 1 to sub-period 2 in counties that were in the upper quartile of log of per 
capita dollars of equipment received. Controls for the following independent variables: percent 
of county residents living in urban areas, percent Black, percent other minorities, log of median 
household income, percent owner-occupied households, percent males age 20-24, and percent 
female-headed households. The first term, interaction of period and treatment, is of primary 
interest, as it captures the change in crime rates in counties that were in the upper quartile of lner. 
The lack of significance of this term does not necessarily confirm a lack of causation, but it does 
suggest that there is not a significant relationship between receiving a large amount of equipment 
and a change in crime rates.   
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Appendix A: Types of Equipment Received 
 
 
Source: Defense Logistics Agency; Credit: David Eads and Tyler Fisher / NPR  
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Appendix B: Independent Variables (links to data sets provided in footnotes): 
Short Name Variable Name Long Definition Source 
CR Number of total 
annual arrests in 
county per 100 
county residents 
The data set, compiled 
annually by the National 
Archive of Criminal Justice 
Data (division of ICPSR at 
the University of Michigan) 
is based off of FBI records 
reported by local law 
enforcement agencies. The 
data set includes columns for 
FIPS code, number of 
individuals arrested in the 
county for over 40 types of 
crimes, measures indicating 
the level of imputation in a 
given county’s values, and 
more. This is a robust, clean 
data set that includes 
thorough codebooks, data 
collection methodologies, 
and imputation algorithm 
explanations: “Within each 
county, data from agencies 
reporting 3 to 11 months of 
information were weighted 
to yield 12-month 
equivalents. Data for 
agencies reporting less than 
three months of data were 
replaced with data estimated 
by rates calculated from 
agencies reporting 12 months 
of data located in the 
agency's geographic stratum 
within its state...  No arrest 
data were provided for 
Florida. Limited arrest data 
were available for Illinois 
and Kentucky. Limited 
offense data were available 
for Alaska, Illinois, 
 Crimet1 - 2005 
Uniform Crime 
Reporting Program 
Data: County-Level 
Detailed Arrest and 
Offense Data8 
 Crimet2 - 2009 
Uniform Crime 
Reporting Program 
Data: County-Level 
Detailed Arrest and 
Offense Data9 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/series/57/studies/4717?archive=NACJD&amp;q=county-level 
9 http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/series/57/studies/30763?archive=NACJD&amp;q=county-level 
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Mississippi, Montana, North 
Dakota, and South Dakota.”7 
For my analysis, I multiply 
the number of arrests by 100 
and divide by 2010 county 
population to obtain crime 
rate per 100 citizens, which 
is a standard crime rate 
metric. 
 
Pop County 
population 
This standard county-level 
U.S. Population Census data 
set is well organized with 
codebooks and 
survey/imputation 
methodologies. Because the 
previous census was in 2000, 
the 2010 census is the best 
available population proxy 
for both sub-period 1 and 
sub-period 2. The logged 
form is used due to the major 
variation in population 
across counties. In order to 
be efficient with data 
importing, the population 
values, which match those 
found in the Census Bureau’s 
primary population data set, 
were obtained from the 
Urban and Rural 
Classification data set (which 
was used for other variables 
in the project). 
 Popt1,t2 - 2010 
Census Urban and 
Rural Classification 
and Urban Area: 
Percent urban and 
rural in 2010 by 
state and county10 
 
 
Urban % of County 
residents living in 
an urban MSA 
This variable, obtained from 
the 2010 Census Urban and 
Rural Classification and 
Urban Area Criteria shows 
the percent of a county’s 
residents that live in a 
densely developed/populated 
 Urbant1,t2 – 2010 
Census Urban and 
Rural Classification 
and Urban Area: 
Percent urban and 
rural in 2010 by 
state and county11 
                                                          
7 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM DATA [UNITED 
STATES]: COUNTY-LEVEL DETAILED ARREST AND OFFENSE DATA, 2005 [Computer file]. 2007. ICPSR04717-v1. Ann 
Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [producer and distributor], 2007-07. 
10 https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/ua/urban-rural-2010.html 
11 https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/ua/urban-rural-2010.html 
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urban area. The two types of 
urban areas identified by the 
Census Bureau are: 
Urbanized Areas (UAs) of 
50,000 or more people or 
Urban Clusters (UCs) of at 
least 2,500 and less than 
50,000 people. This variable 
is not used in the primary 
regressions, but is used as a 
control when estimating 
crime rate. 
 
 
Repub % of county 
residents that 
voted for 
Republican 
presidential 
candidate in 
national election 
County-level election results 
from the 2008 and 2012 U.S. 
Presidential Elections are 
available on data.gov. These 
data sets were compiled and 
published by the National 
Atlas of the United States, a 
division of the U.S. 
Geological Survey.  The data 
sets include FIPS codes; 
number of popular votes for 
the Republican candidate, 
Democratic candidate, and 
other candidate; and percent 
of total votes cast for each 
candidate. I have chosen to 
use presidential election 
results as a proxy for a 
county’s political preferences 
because it is a more direct 
comparison across 
counties/regions and because 
this data is available for most 
counties. These two data sets 
have been cleaned and 
checked for consistency by 
National Atlas employees. 
The files include a codebook, 
list of source files (election 
boards, etc. for each state), 
and explanation of how the 
 Repubt1 – 2008 
Presidential 
Election Results12 
 Repubt2 – 2012 
Presidential 
Election Results13 
                                                          
12 https://catalog.data.gov/data set/2008-presidential-general-election-county-results-direct-download 
13 https://catalog.data.gov/data set/presidential-general-election-results-2012-direct-download 
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source files were merged by 
geographies. 
PE Annual police 
expenditures per 
arrest in county 
These county-level data sets 
are provided by the U.S. 
Census Bureau upon 
submission of a Freedom of 
Information Act request. The 
Census of Governments is a 
complete survey that occurs 
every five years (years 
ending in a 2 or 7). The data 
set includes columns for 
FIPS code, transaction type, 
transaction amount, the 
number of local governments 
in the county, and 
measurements indicating the 
degree of imputation for a 
given county. The 2007 file 
contains over 300,000 rows 
of transaction types 
(expenditures on various 
services, intergovernmental 
transfers, revenue sources, 
capital expenditures, 
financing costs, etc.). I 
computed the dollars spent in 
each county on transaction 
type E62, “Current 
Operations - Police 
Protection.” This value is the 
sum of police operations 
spending from all local 
governments within a county 
(not just the county 
government). In order to 
calculate the desired 
variable, dollars of police 
spending per arrest, we will 
simply divide the county’s 
police spending by its total 
number of arrests from the 
period. As was previously 
mentioned, my advisor and I 
 PEt1 – 2007 Census 
of Governments, 
Finances of County 
Areas, Revised14 
 PEt2 – 2012 Census 
of Governments, 
Finances of County 
Areas15 
                                                          
14 No link available because data was provided by the Census Bureau through a non-public server.  
15 No link available because data was provided by the Census Bureau through a non-public server. 
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feel that this metric is a 
better indicator of how tight 
a county’s law enforcement 
agencies’ budgets are. It is 
also easier to compare across 
counties, which may allocate 
finances less consistently in 
the national census. 
Black % of county 
residents that 
identify as 
African American 
alone 
Variable representing the 
estimated number of African 
American individuals in a 
county. This value is 
obtained from the American 
Community Survey 5-year 
estimates of race 
characteristics, which 
surveys all counties over a 
five year period. The 
estimate was divided by the 
total population column in 
the ACS data set to obtain 
percent African American 
values. 
 Blackt1 - 2009 
American 
Community Survey: 
Demographic and 
Housing 5-year 
Estimates 
 Blackt2 – 2012 
American 
Community Survey: 
Demographic and 
Housing 5-year 
Estimates  
Other % of county 
residents that do 
not identify as 
white or black 
only  
Variable representing the 
estimated number of non-
white and non-black 
individuals in a county 
(includes Asian, Native 
American, mixed race, etc.). 
This value is also obtained 
from the American 
Community Survey 5-year 
estimates of race 
characteristics, which 
surveys all counties over a 
five year period. The value 
was obtained by computing 1 
- % white - % black for each 
county. 
 Othert1 - 2009 
American 
Community Survey: 
Demographic and 
Housing 5-year 
Estimates 
 Othert2 – 2012 
American 
Community Survey: 
Demographic and 
Housing 5-year 
Estimates 
Inc Median 
household income 
in county 
Variable representing the log 
of a county’s median 
household income. This 
value is obtained from the 
American Community 
Survey 5-year estimates of 
Selected Economic 
 Inct1 - 2009 
American 
Community Survey: 
Selected Economic 
Characteristics 5-
year Estimates 
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Characteristics, which 
surveys all counties over a 
five year period. The value is 
logged to better handle 
outliers.  
 Inct2 – 2012 
American 
Community Survey: 
Selected Economic 
Characteristics 5-
year Estimates 
OO % of county 
households that 
are owner-
occupied 
Variable representing the 
percent of households in a 
county that are occupied by 
the property’s owner. This 
value is obtained from the 
American Community 
Survey 5-year estimates of 
Selected Housing 
Characteristics, which 
surveys all counties over a 
five year period.  
 OOt1 - 2009 
American 
Community Survey: 
Selected Housing 
Characteristics 5-
year Estimates 
 OOt2 – 2012 
American 
Community Survey: 
Selected Housing 
Characteristics 5-
year Estimates 
PctYoungMen % of county 
residents that are 
males age 20-24 
Represents percent of county 
population that are males 
between the age of 20 and 
24. This value is also 
obtained from the American 
Community Survey 5-year 
estimates of age and sex 
characteristics, which 
surveys all counties over a 
five year period. This is one 
of two instruments used in 
my analysis.  
 PctYoungMent1 - 
2009 American 
Community Survey: 
Age and Sex 5-year 
Estimates 
 PctYoungMent2 – 
2012 American 
Community Survey: 
Age and Sex 5-year 
Estimates 
FemHead % of county 
households with 
female 
householder and 
no husband 
present 
Represents the percent of 
households in the county 
with a female householder, 
no husband, and a family. 
This value is obtained from 
the American Community 
Survey 5-year estimates of 
Selected Social 
Characteristics, which 
surveys all counties over a 
five year period. This is one 
of two instruments used in 
my analysis. 
 FemHeadt1 - 2009 
American 
Community Survey: 
Selected Social 
Characteristics 5-
year Estimates 
 FemHeadt2 – 2012 
American 
Community Survey: 
Selected Social 
Characteristics 5-
year Estimates 
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FIPS County or county-
equivalent 
identification 
number 
ID Variable used to ensure 
that all counties are 
accounted for in master data 
set. For states that do not 
have counties, FIPS numbers 
are assigned based on 
county-equivalents 
(townships, legislative 
districts, etc.). 
 U.S. Census 
Geography 
Reference16 
  
 
 
 
                                                          
16 http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/codes/cou.html 
